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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT-PER
SE REVERSAL RULE ADOPTED WHERE PROSECUTOR VOUCHES FOR
THE CREDIBILITY OF A WITNESS BASED ON EVIDENCE OUTSIDE
THE RECORD
United States v. DiLoreto (1989)
I. INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors often attempt to bolster the state's case by either sug-
gesting that a criminal defendant is guilty or by vouching for the credi-
bility of a government witness. Such statements by the prosecutor,
during closing argument to the jury in a criminal trial when the state-
ments are not based on the evidence adduced at trial, are proscribed
both by the courts I and by the American Bar Association. 2 Prosecutors,
however, continue to engage in this questionable practice. 3 In an at-
1. The courts react in a variety of ways to a prosecutor's misconduct. While
courts uniformly agree that a prosecutor's statements suggesting a defendant's
guilt or vouching for the credibility of a witness when the statements are not
based on evidence adduced at trial are inappropriate and prohibited, very few
appellate courts actually reverse a lower court decision solely on that basis. See,
e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18 (1985) (recognizing prosecutor's
argument as error, but where no objection made by defendant, not plain error);
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935) (prosecutor's improper sugges-
tions held harmless error); United States v. Dipasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1296 (3d
Cir. 1984) (applying reply doctrine, found error harmless), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1228 (1985); United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1051 (4th Cir. 1983)
(conduct of prosecutor could have prejudiced trial, but judge neutralized preju-
dice with jury instruction), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984); see also, United States
v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336, 340 (3d Cir. 1980) (prosecutor improperly vouched
for credibility of witness and suggested defendant's guilt, but prejudice neutral-
ized by judge's charge and reversal not warranted); United States v. Gallagher,
576 F.2d 1028, 1041 (3d Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's vouching for veracity of gov-
ernment witnesses did not require reversal in view of strong evidence of guilt);
United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 740 (3d Cir.) (limiting per se reversal to
statements regarding defendant's guilt based on evidence not on the record),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974); United States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477, 479 (3d
Cir. 1973) (statements referring to facts not in evidence not reversible error per
se, but court obligated to consider entire record to determine prejudicial effect).
For further discussion of the problem of prosecutorial misconduct, see gen-
erally, B. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 10.5 (1989) (concise analy-
sis of courts' response to improper conduct in closing arguments by
prosecutors); J. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 9.09, 9.22 (1985)
(same); see also Annotation, Propriety and Preudicial Effect of Comments by Counsel
Vouching for Credibility of Witness-Federal Cases, 78 A.L.R. FED. 1, 23 (1986).
2. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DE-
FENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971) [hereinafter PROSECUTION STANDARDS];
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. Supp. 1982).
3. United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 736 (3d Cir.) ("We have faced
this question [of prosecutorial misconduct] all too frequently in recent years."),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974); United States v. Falk, 605 F.2d 1005, 1016 (7th
(783)
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tempt to preclude this inappropriate prosecutorial behavior, courts util-
ize a variety of sanctions ranging from reprimanding the prosecutor to
reversing a conviction on appeal. 4 Some courts have threatened the im-
position of stronger sanctions if prosecutors continue to make inappro-
priate statements during closing arguments. 5
A primary concern regarding the effect of these improper state-
ments is that the jury may accord excessive weight to a prosecutor's re-
marks.6 Undue deference to a prosecutor's statements may result
because jury members often doubt their own judgment of the evidence.
Consequently, instead of reaching their own conclusions based on the
evidence adduced at trial, jury members may defer to the prosecutor's
Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("Unfortunately flagrant abuses of profes-
sional standards ... seem to be occuring more frequently in this circuit."), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980); see also, United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 371 (3d
Cir.) (en banc) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("Our tongue clicking over improper
argument by government counsel has been notoriously ineffective in preventing
it, as the persistent need to resort to gentle chastisement amply demonstrates."),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944 (1979).
4. See, e.g., B. GERSHMAN, supra note 1, § 13. Gershman provides a discus-
sion of the various sanctions employed by the courts in dealing with
prosecutorial misconduct. Id. § 13-1. "Judicial sanctions include appellate re-
versals, contempt citations, and other judicial techniques to enforce discipline,
namely, suspension from practice, imposition of fines, and rebukes published in
appellate opinions." Id. § 13-2. Appellate reversal in most jurisdictions is disfa-
vored as a method of dealing with prosecutorial misconduct because its deter-
rent effect on the prosecutor's behavior may not be sufficient to warrant the
waste of judicial time and the possible harm to society if a guilty defendant is
released. Id. §§ 13-2 to -3 (citing United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1182-
86 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982)).
One reason why prosecutorial misconduct is perceived as especially im-
proper is because of the prosecutor's dual responsibility to be an advocate for
the government, as well as to see that the case is justly tried. See United States v.
Berger, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United States Attorney is the representa-
tive.., of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all.").
5. See, e.g., United States v. Farnkoff, 535 F.2d 661, 668 n.17 (1st Cir. 1976)
(reversal may occur if prosecutorial abuse continues); United States v. Somers,
496 F.2d 723, 742 (3d Cir.) (warning of more drastic and prophylactic measures
if abuses continue), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974).
6. The Third Circuit expressed its concern regarding the effect of these im-
proper comments on the jury in United States v. Schartner. 426 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1970). In Schartner, the prosecutor, in his closing argument, informed the jury
that he had a duty to protect the innocent and that, in all sincerity, if they let the
defendant go, the guilty would escape. Id. at 478. The Schartner court deemed
these improper prosecutorial remarks as inviting the jury to rely on the govern-
ment attorney's experience where such general experience was not based on the
evidence presented in the case. Id. Therefore, the court found that remarks
which were not based on the evidence must not be allowed to influence the
jury's decision. Id. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (im-
proper suggestions and assertions of personal knowledge likely to carry exces-
sive weight against accused). For a further discussion of Berger, see infra note 13;
see also PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 2, §§ 3.5-5.8 & commentary at 88
(jury may afford prosecutor's argument special weight due to prestige of office
and presumed fact-finding expertise).
784
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superior knowledge and experience in criminal cases. 7 A jury's defer-
ence to the prosecutor shifts the advantage to the prosecution and may
prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial.
In United States v. DiLoreto,8 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit was presented with the issue of whether statements
made by a prosecutor in his closing argument were improper and
whether the resulting prejudice to the defendant warranted a new trial.9
The DiLoreto court adopted a strict per se rule of reversal.10 The court
held that when a prosecutor improperly vouches for the credibility of a
witness, and the statements are based on facts not in the record, reversal
is required per se. I In previous decisions involving such misconduct by
prosecutors, the Third Circuit had required that the defendant show un-
fair prejudice from the prosecutor's statements before reversal of an
otherwise valid conviction was warranted.1 2 Therefore, the court's deci-
7. For example, in United States v. Young, the Supreme Court stated that
"[s]uch comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the
jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant
... and the prosecutor's opinion .. .may induce the jury to trust the govern-
ment's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." 470 U.S. 1, 18
(1985).
8. 888 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 888 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir.
1990).
9. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 997. The prosecutor in his closing remarks stated:
"[W]e don't take liars. We don't put liars on the stand." Id. at 998. For a fur-
ther discussion of the facts in DiLoreto, see infra notes 15-28 and accompanying
text.
10. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 1000.
11. Id.
12. See United States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1973). In LeFevre,
the defendant was convicted of seven counts of wilfully preparing false and
fraudulent income tax returns. Id. at 478. During his closing argument the
prosecutor repeatedly expressed his personal opinion concerning the credibility
of the defendant. Id. Without expressly stating what the prosecutor's remarks
had been, the Third Circuit in LeFevre adopted Standard 5.9 of the ABA Prosecu-
tion Standards to dispel any notions that such inappropriate remarks by prose-
cutors were acceptable. Id. The court noted:
It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to refer to
or argue on the basis of facts outside the record whether at trial or on
appeal, unless such facts are matters of common knowledge based on
ordinary human experience or matters of which the court may take ju-
dicial notice.
Id. at 479 (quoting STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (Approved Draft 1971) § 5.9). The LeFevre court then
examined the prosecutor's statements to determine if they fell within the two
exceptions where the prosecutor can argue outside the record: the common
public knowledge or judicial notice exceptions. Id. at 479. The court found that
the remarks in this case did not fall within either exception. Id. The Third Cir-
cuit's inquiry next turned to whether the comments were of such a nature that
they warranted reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id. at 479-80. The court
did not adopt a per se rule, but instead examined the whole record to determine
whether the statements had unduly prejudiced the defendant's case so that re-
versal was the only appropriate remedy to effect justice. Id. at 479. On examin-
3
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sion in DiLoreto is a deviation from prior Third Circuit precedent. The
DiLoreto court's holding of a per se rule not only deviates from its own
precedent, but arguably runs contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's position that convictions should be reversed only where the de-
fendant establishes that unfair prejudice resulted from the trial court's
error in allowing improper prosecutorial statements.1 3 Where no unfair
ing the whole record, however, the court decided that the prosecutor's
deviations were not sufficiently egregious to justify a new trial. Id. at 480.
The requirement that there be a showing of unfair prejudice was also noted
by the court in United States v. Somers. 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1974). The Somers
court stated that its primary concern was the fairness of the procedure followed
at trial, and therefore, the court would reverse "upon demonstrations of
prosecutorial misconduct only in those situations in which prejudice inures to
the defendant from the challenged improprieties." Id. at 737 (citing Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969)).
13. In United States v. Young, the Supreme Court exhibited its reluctance to
use reversal as a method of sanctioning prosecutors for improper conduct. 470
U.S. 1 (1985). The Court in Young maintained that "[ilnappropriate prosecutor-
ial comments, standing alone, would not justify a reviewing court to reverse a
criminal conviction obtained in an otherwise fair proceeding." Id. at 11-12. The
Court cited United States v. Lawn, as demonstrating that a prosecutor's "remarks
must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the pros-
ecutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error." Young, 470 U.S. at 12 (citing
United States v. Lawn, 355 U.S. 339, 342 (1958)). The Court affirmed that fed-
eral courts are required to examine the record in its entirety to determine
whether prejudice resulted from the prosecutor's comments before reversing
the trial court's decision.
Similarly, in United States v. Hasting, the Court asserted that appellate courts
do not have the privilege, except in very rare cases, to reverse decisions where
the challenged error was harmless. 461 U.S. 499, 528 (1983) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). The Court then discussed the limits of thejudiciary's supervisory pow-
ers. Id. at 505-07. "The purposes underlying use of the supervisory powers are
threefold: to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights . . . ; to
preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate
considerations validly before the jury ... ; and finally, as a remedy designed to
deter illegal conduct .. " Id. at 505 (citations omitted). The Hasting Court
stated that "[t]he goals that are implicated by supervisory powers are not, how-
ever, significant in the context of this case if, as the Court of Appeals plainly
implied, the errors alleged are harmless." Id. at 506. The Court specifically
addressed the possibility of using reversal as a form of sanction against prosecu-
tors stating that "deterrence is an inappropriate basis for reversal .... Id. The
Court asserted that reversals were to be ordered only after the interests of the
courts and the defendant had been balanced. Id. at 507. In the Hasting case, the
Court inferred that the court of appeals had focused "on its concern that the
prosecutors within its jurisdiction were indifferent to the frequent admonitions
of the court." Id.; see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). In Kot-
teakos, which did not involve prosecutorial misconduct, the Court discussed the
harmless error guidelines, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 391, that are to be applied
by federal courts and noted:
[To] weigh the error's effect against the entire setting of the record
without relation to the verdict or judgment would be almost to work in
a vacuum. In criminal cases that outcome is conviction. This is differ-
ent, or may be, from guilt in fact. It is guilt in law, established by the
judgment of laymen. And the question is, not were they right in their
judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is
[Vol. 35: p. 783786
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prejudice has resulted, the error is said to be harmless and reversal of
the outcome, in an otherwise fair proceeding, is not required. 14
II. DIscussIoN
The five defendants in DiLoreto were charged with conspiracy, pos-
session of cocaine with intent to deliver, possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute and other related drug offenses.' 5 The five cases
were consolidated for trial and tried to a jury which convicted all five
rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had
upon the jury's decision.
Id. at 764 (citations omitted).
The Court's approach to reversal where the procedure followed at trial has
not been perfect, but the defendant has not been prejudiced by that imperfec-
tion, is demonstrated by Berger v. United States. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). In Berger, the
Supreme Court settled a conflict that had existed between the circuit courts con-
cerning how variations between the charges as stated in an indictment for con-
spiracy and what actually was proved at trial by the evidence were to be treated.
Id. at 82. Some circuits had held that a variance between the indictment and the
evidence required reversal where the indictment charged one conspiracy and the
evidence showed that actually two conspiracies existed, while other circuits had
suggested that the variance was not material and reversal was not necessary. Id.
at 81. The Court disliked the approach favoring reversal because it ignored the
materiality of the evidence. Id. The Supreme Court qualified that approach to
require reversal only where the variance had substantially injured the defendant.
Id. Where prejudice did not occur, the error was to be regarded as harmless. Id.
at 82. In the facts of Berger, the indictment charged conspiracy involving several
persons and the proof had established that only some of those persons had been
involved in the conspiracy. Id. at 81-83. The variance was found to be harmless
because in this case it was not prejudicial and hence not fatal. Id. at 83-84.
The same analysis applies in the case of prosecutorial misconduct. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 52 (addressing errors made in the trial procedure). For further dis-
cussion of Rule 52, see infra note 14.
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). The rule provides the following: "Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not effect substantial rights shall be
disregarded." Id. This rule is to be applied by all federal courts, but is primarily
relied upon by appellate courts in determining whether an error made at trial
warrants reversal.
The harmless error rule was adopted in an effort to counter appellate rever-
sals of convictions for the mere failure to follow legal technicalities which had
not resulted in prejudice to the defendant. The harmless error rule is based on
the premise that although defendants are entitled to a fair trial, they are not
entitled to a perfect one. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32
(1973) (defendant entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one) (quoting Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)); United States v. Leftwich, 461 F.2d
586, 590 (3d Cir.) (trials are rarely, if ever, perfect and improprieties of argu-
ment by counsel do not call for a new trial unless prejudice inures to defendant),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1972); Leonard v. United States, 386 F.2d 423, 425
(5th Cir. 1967) (Constitution requires fair trial but not necessarily error-free
trial).
15. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 997. A grand jury returned a 34 count indictment
against the five defendants. Id. The government alleged that the defendants
were part of a continuing enterprise and that one defendant, Patrick DiLoreto,
was the leader of the organization responsible for locating and purchasing the
drugs. Id.
5
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defendants. ' 6
At trial, the defense attorneys criticized the government's witnesses
in both their opening and closing statements. 17 The defense empha-
sized that the witnesses were admitted accomplices of the defendants
and had made favorable plea agreements with the government in return
for their testimony implicating the defendants. 18 In their closing argu-
ment, defense counsel portrayed the government's witnesses as "cor-
rupt and polluted" and as "biased and incredible."' 9
The government prosecutor attempted to refute these negative
characterizations in his rebuttal to the defense's closing argument.
20
The prosecutor admitted to the jury that the witnesses were "terrible
people." 2 1 He also pointed out, however, that the witnesses' plea agree-
ments obligated them to tell the truth, and that their failure to testify
truthfully would result in a breach of the plea agreement nullifying the
bargain struck between the defendants and the government.
2 2
Finally, the prosecutor, in his rebuttal, stated that "[w]e [the govern-
ment] don't take liars. We don't put liars on the stand. We don't do that."23
Defense counsel objected to these statements as improper vouching for
the credibility of a witness. 24 The defense then moved for a mistrial on
the ground that the prosecutor's statements "constituted improper
prosecutorial vouching depriving [the defendants] of a fair trial."' 25 The
defense attorneys also sought a curative instruction to the jury explain-
16. Id.
17. Id. at 998. None of the defendants testified at the trial. Id. at 997-98.
Instead, the defense "relied on cross-examination to assault the government's
witnesses." Id.
18. Id. at 998. The defense stated that it would "prove that every witness
that testiflied] in the case would not be testifying as a witness ... but for the fact
that they have a deal or some type of preferential arrangement with the govern-
ment [that] allows them to walk out of a penitentiary .... " Id.
19. Id. The defense claimed in its closing argument that the witnesses were
individuals "who would be motivated by their own benefits, by their own inter-
ests, by their own motives." Id. The defense attorneys asserted that the testi-
mony of the government witnesses was "the lowest form of testimony
admissable in a court of law." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The prosecutor in DiLoreto told the jury that "[t]hese witnesses are
all terrrible people. They are all drug users. They are all drug dealers." Id.
22. Id. The prosecutor emphasized that the only individuals who would
have the background to be valuable witnesses for the prosecution in drug re-
lated cases would be drug dealers: "Who else do you get to come into court...
and tell you about where they got drugs but drug dealers... ? You want to learn
about drugs, you go to a drug dealer." Id.
23. Id. (emphasis in original).
24. Id.
25. Id. In DiLoreto, the defense made a timely objection to the perceived
error by the prosecutor. Id. Absent a timely objection, a reviewing court may
only reverse a decision where there has been plain error, pursuant to Rule 52(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Plain error
is present when the statements by the prosecutor were such that the fundamen-
788 [Vol. 35: p. 783
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ing the impropriety of the prosecutor's statements. 26 The district court
judge denied both motions. 2 7 The defendants appealed the district
court's decision to the Third Circuit, alleging that the prosecutor's im-
proper vouching constituted reversible error.2 8
The Third Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that a prosecu-
tor may refer to the conditions in a plea agreement requiring that a wit-
ness testify truthfully as a way of rehabilitating a witness's credibility. 2 9
The court reasoned, however, that when a prosecutor vouches for the
truthfulness of government witnesses he has exceeded the limits of
proper rehabilitation. 30 The DiLoreto court thus determined that be-
cause the prosecutor vouched for the witnesses by asserting that they
were not liars, the prosecutor's remarks had exceeded the limits of
proper rehabilitation. 3 1
The DiLoreto court cited to the United States Supreme Court's state-
ments in United States v. Young 32 to support the prohibition against
tal fairness of the trial was undermined, resulting in a miscarriage ofjustice. See
id.
Where a timely objection has been made, a court can, pursuant to Rule
52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, reverse a lower court decision
if the prosecutor's misconduct constituted prejudicial error. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
52(a). In DiLoreto, the defense did make a timely objection and thus the court
was required to consider Rule 52(a) before reversing the district court's deci-
sion. See id. For a discussion of the harmless error doctrine, see supra notes 13-
14.
26. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 998.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Third Circuit stated that the appropriate standard for review-
ing the district court's denial of a mistrial was whether the court abused its dis-
cretion. Id. (citing United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 175 (3d Cir.
1986)).
29. Id. (citing United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir. 1984),
vacated sub nom., United States v. Pfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985)). The defendants
in United States v. Oxman had been convicted and sentenced for mail fraud. 740
F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated sub nom., United States v. Pfaumer, 473
U.S. 922 (1985). The defendants contended that a new trial was warranted be-
cause the prosecuting attorney had vouched for the truthfulness of a govern-
ment witness. Id. at 1302. The Third Circuit concluded that because the
government could reasonably anticipate that the defense would try to use the
beneficial features of the agreement for impeachment purposes on cross-exami-
nation, the prosecutor's reference to the condition requiring truthful testimony
was proper rehabilitation. Id. at 1302-03. The court cited to a number of deci-
sions from other circuits which held that reference to the condition of a plea
agreement requiring truthful testimony was proper even where the witness's
credibility was not at issue. Id. at 1303.
30. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 998.
31. Id. (citing United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090, 1097 (3d Cir. 1983)
(prosecutor's comment found to be improper vouching)). See United States v.
Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 1980) (court reprimanded prosecutor who
vouched for witness's credibility). The court in Swinehart also noted that a prose-
cutor may not "express his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the defend-
ant." Swinehart, 617 F.2d at 339.
32. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
7
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prosecutorial vouching for the credibility of a witness:
Such comments can convey the impression that evidence not
presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports
the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the
defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence
presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with
it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury
to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of
the evidence. 33
The DiLoreto court recognized, however, that in prior cases involv-
ing improper prosecutorial statements, the Third Circuit had drawn a
distinction between the prosecutor's expressions of personal opinion
based on evidence introduced at trial, and expressions of personal opin-
ion based on information outside the record. 34 When a prosecutor has
engaged in improper vouching, but the remarks were premised on evi-
dence introduced at trial, the Third Circuit has not required automatic
reversal, but has instead required the defendant to demonstrate that
prejudice resulted from the prosecutor's statements. 3 5 Alternatively,
where the prosecutor's improper statements were premised on informa-
tion outside the record, the Third Circuit had previously required per se
reversal only when the prosecutor's statements touched upon the guilt
of the defendant and not when the statements constituted vouching for
the credibility of a government witness. 3 6 In United States v. Schartner,37
the defendant objected to certain statements made by the prosecutor in
33. Id. at 18-19 (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935)).
34. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999; see United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090,
1097 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[T]his Circuit has long distinguished between expressions
of personal opinion based on evidence and those based on facts not in evi-
dence."); United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1041-42 (3d Cir. 1978)
(case law differentiates between expressions of personal opinion based on facts
adduced at trial and those based on evidence outside record).
35. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 1000 (citing United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090
(3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 832 (1974)). The Third Circuit, in Somers, pointed to considerations ofjudi-
cial administration as justification for discouraging the reversal of decisions in
every case where adversarial improprieties existed. Somers, 496 F.2d at 737. In-
stead, the Somers court asserted that decisions were to be reversed "upon dem-
onstrations of prosecutorial misconduct only in those situations in which
prejudice inures to the defendant from the challenged improprieties." Id.
36. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999.
37. 426 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1970). In Schartner, the prosecutor in his closing
argument stated to the jury "that if you do not convict the defendant, the guilty will
escape." Id. at 477 (emphasis in original). The court reiterated its disapproval of
such improper comments, but stated that where the comments, fairly construed,
referred to a belief based on the evidence and "not to an opinion formed from
facts not in evidence," the expression was not reversible error. Id. The court
held in Schartner that the prosecutor's comment implied a personal belief in the
defendant's guilt and that such comments also directly invited the jury to rely on
the prosecutor's sincerity and experience in prosecuting criminals. Id. at 478.
8
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closing argument in which the prosecutor expressed his sincere belief
that if the jury did not convict the defendant, the guilty would escape.38
The court noted that the prosecutor's general experience and his moral
integrity had nothing to do with the evidence in the case and held that
reversal per se was required where the prosecutor expressed an opinion
concerning the guilt of a defendant, based on evidence not introduced
at trial.3 9
The DiLoreto court, citing numerous Third Circuit decisions, recog-
nized that this per se rule had previously been "limited strictly to those
extraneous comments that impacted upon the guilt of the defendant."40 For
example, the DiLoreto court noted United States v. Somers,4 t a 1974 Third
Circuit decision where the court had previously declined to extend the
per se reversal rule to include statements that did not constitute an opin-
ion as to the defendant's guilt.4 2 The Third Circuit had expressed this
same limitation in United States v. LeFevre.4 3 In LeFevre, the court refused
to extend the per se rule to encompass prosecutorial statements that re-
ferred to facts not adduced at trial which did not concern the defend-
ant's guilt.4 4 According to the LeFevre court, improper statements (such
as vouching for the credibility of a witness) that did not improperly sug-
gest the defendant's guilt were not sufficient to require reversal per se.
4 5
The DiLoreto court concluded, nevertheless, that although the per se
reversal rule had never formally been extended by the Third Circuit to
include a prosecutor's improper statements vouching for the credibility
of a witness, the extension of the rule was "clearly evidenced in United
States v. Swinehart.' '4 6 The prosecutor in Swinehart. had expressed a per-
sonal opinion regarding the defendant's guilt. 4 7 The prosecutor had
also vouched for the veracity of one of the government's witnesses, a
handwriting expert, saying that "[h]e was an honest witness."'4 8 The
Swinehart court acknowledged that the prosecutor's statements were im-
proper under Third Circuit precedent and the Code of Professional Re-
38. Id. at 477.
39. Id.
40. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999 (emphasis in original).
41. 496 F.2d 723 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832 (1974).
42. Id. at 740.
43. 483 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1973). For further discussion of LeFevre, see supra
note 12.
44. LeFevre, 483 F.2d at 479.
45. Id.
46. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999 (citing United States v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d
336 (3d Cir. 1980)).
47. United States v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336, 338 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980). The
prosecutor stated: "[Wiho but a guilty person would sign the name of another
person .... Innocent persons do not attempt to cash checks on accounts in
which the only deposits .. .were stolen U.S. Savings Bonds." Id.
48. Id. at n.3.
1990]
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sponsibility of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.49 The court found,
however, that the improper prosecutorial comments, including the pros-
ecutor's vouching, had been limited to the evidence introduced at trial
and thus did not constitute reversible error per se. 50 In dicta, the Swine-
hart court drew a distinction between "prosecutorial remarks regarding
the defendant's guilt or a witness's credibility that are based on the evi-
dence and those that are based on information outside the record."'5 1
The DiLoreto court relied on this dicta to conclude that statements con-
cerning a witness's credibility could be subject to per se reversal if the
statements were based on evidence not introduced at trial.5 2
In DiLoreto, the Third Circuit relied on the Swinehart dicta and ap-
plied this principle of per se reversal to the statements at issue.5 3 The
government had argued, in DiLoreto, that the prosecutor's statements
were merely intended to emphasize the condition in the plea agree-
ments that the witnesses testify truthfully.54 The DiLoreto court did not
accept this characterization of the remarks, but instead determined that
"[tihe remarks [were] better understood as meaning that the govern-
ment, as a matter of policy in the prosecution of its cases, [did] not use
liars as witnesses." '5 5 Moreover, the court concluded that no evidence
had been admitted that supported the government's assertions that the
government did not place liars on the stand. 56 The court concluded,
therefore, that the statements made by the prosecutor must have been
based on information outside the record. 5 7 Accordingly, per se reversal
was required under Swinehart.
Even after finding that the statements required per se reversal, the
court went on to analyze, in dicta, the potential impact of the prosecu-
tor's statements upon the jury. The DiLoreto court stated that the prose-
cutor's remarks could reasonably have persuaded the jury to believe that
49. Ethical Canon 7-24 of the Code provides in pertinent part:
The expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the justness of
a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil
litigant or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not proper sub-
ject for argument to the trier of fact.
Id. at n.7 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-24
(1980)).
50. Swinehart, 617 F.2d at 339. The defense attorney in that case did not
object to the remarks, nor did he ask for a curative instruction. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999.
53. Id. at 1000.
54. Id. at 999.
55. Id. The court noted, however, that "[n]o explanation was given... of
how the government ascertains the honesty or veracity of its witnesses." Id.
56. Id. The court stated that it had "found nothing in the record upon
which the prosecutor could have grounded his statement." Id.
57. Id. The court was concerned that "the defendants were not confronted
with this extraneous evidence and afforded cross-examination, nor was the jury
given an opportunity to engage in its own evaluation." Id.
[Vol. 35: p. 783
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the government's witnesses were being truthful. 58 As a result, the court
found that the "assertions may have improperly influenced the jury and
contributed substantially to its verdicts." 5 9 In light of the court's find-
ing that the prosecutor's remarks were based on evidence outside the
record, it is unclear why the court took the time to examine the state-
ment's potential impact on the jury.
The court concluded that because the prosecutor's statements were
based on facts outside the record, per se reversible error had resulted.60
Accordingly, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion for a mistrial as an abuse of discretion. 6 1
III. ANALYSIS
DiLoreto provides a bright-line rule in the Third Circuit for deciding
whether reversal is required when a prosecutor improperly vouches for
the credibility of a witness based on evidence outside the record. After
DiLoreto, courts will no longer be required to determine whether im-
proper statements by a prosecutor unfairly prejudiced the defendant at
all. 6 2 The court's sole task, henceforth, will be to determine whether the
prosecutor's statement: 1) vouched for the credibility of the witness and
2) was based on evidence outside the record. If the court concludes that
the prosecutor did vouch for the witness using evidence outside the rec-
ord, then under DiLoreto the court should apply the per se reversal rule
and reverse the conviction.
The Third Circuit's prior reluctance to expand the per se reversal
rule conformed to the United States Supreme Court's unwillingness to
58. Id. at 999-1000. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's concern regard-
ing the possibility of the jury deferring to the prosecutor's perceived credibility,
see supra note 6.
59. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 1000. The DiLoreto court cited United States v. Gal-
lagher, as an example of a case where the court's concern as to the jury being
improperly influenced led a circuit court of appeals to prohibit such a
prosecutorial comment in closing arguments. Id. (citing United States v. Gal-
lagher, 576 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1978)).
While the DiLoreto court cited to Gallagher, and the court in Gallagher did in
fact characterize such conduct as being prohibited, the Third Circuit in Gallagher
did not treat the prosecutor's misconduct as a basis for reversal. Gallagher, 576
F.2d at 1042-43. After quoting ABA Standards, The Prosecution Function § 5.8(b),
as prohibiting prosecutors from basing their arguments on their own personal
opinion regarding the guilt or credibility of a defendant, the Gallagher court held
that, because there were strong indicia of guilt, the prosecutor's conduct in this
case was not grounds for reversal. Id. at 1043.
60. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 1000.
61. Id.
62. See id. Once the Third Circuit decides that the prosecutor improperly
vouched for the credibility of the witness, based on information not adduced at
trial, the analysis is complete. The per se rule applies, and the court need not
determine whether the defendant was actually prejudiced by the prosecutor's
improper comment, but rather assumes that prejudice is inherent in that type of
comment.
1990] 793
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reverse convictions in the absence of unfair prejudice.63 In United States
v. Young, 64 a defense attorney had attacked the prosecutor's integrity
and stated that the prosecutor did not believe in the government's
case.6 5 The prosecutor, in rebuttal to the defense attorney's statements,
stated in his closing argument that the defendant was guilty and that the
jury should "do its job."' 66 The Young Court, in reviewing the prosecu-
tor's statements, concluded that, although improper when viewed in
context of the entire record, the statements did not so undermine the
fairness of the trial so as to require reversal. 67 In Young, the Supreme
Court stated that "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned
on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the state-
ments or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of
the trial." 68
Young also evidenced the Supreme Court's view that when a prose-
cutor's statements exceeded the proper scope of rehabilitation, and the
defense counsel raised a timely objection to those remarks, "a reviewing
court could reverse an otherwise proper conviction only after conclud-
ing that the error was not harmless."169 Under the DiLoreto per se reversal
rule, the court is not required to apply a harmless error analysis; this
means that the court should not examine whether the error was so insig-
nificant in relation to the whole record that it did not unfairly prejudice
63. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's position on per se reversals, see
supra notes 13-14, and infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
64. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
65. Id. at 4-5.
66. Id. at 5-6.
67. Id. at 20.
68. Id. at 11. The Court, following this statement, discussed the "invited
response doctrine." The Young Court suggested that the prosecutor's comments
were to be evaluated in relation to the defense's behavior during the trial. Id.
(citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 242 (1940);
Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361, 364 (1891)). When the prosecutor
responds in his closing argument to attacks by the defense counsel, the prosecu-
tor is deemed to have made an "invited response." The invited response doc-
trine has been applied by various courts to deny reversal. See GERSHMAN, supra
note 4, § 13.2(d). Gershman states that the doctrine "permits retaliatory
prosecutorial responses in order to equalize the positions of both trial advocates
and remedy unethical defense conduct." Id. (citing United States v. Tasto, 586
F.2d 1068, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 928 (1979); Reynolds v.
State, 505 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)).
The invited response doctrine had been used by the Third Circuit in prior
decisions when evaluating whether the prosecutor's statements warranted rever-
sal of a district court decision. See United States v. Dipasquale, 740 F.2d 1282,
1296 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying the invited reply doctrine, error found harmless),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228 (1985).
69. Young, 470 U.S. at 13 n.10 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499
(1983)). The harmless error rule was instituted by the judicial system in an at-
tempt to prevent courts from granting mistrials or reversing trial court decisions
absent prejudice inurring to the defendant. See supra notes 13 & 14.
[Vol. 35: p. 783
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the defendant's case. 70 DiLoreto's per se reversal rule, in contrast, aban-
dons the harmless error rule when considering statements vouching for
the creditability of a witness made by the prosecutor that are based on
evidence outside the record. Only in obiter dictum did the DiLoreto court
analyze the effect of a prosecutor's statements on the jury.7 1 The Third
Circuit concluded that "the assertions may have improperly influenced
the jury and contributed substantially to its verdicts. These concerns
have previously occasioned our prohibition of this kind of prosecutorial
comment."'7 2 The court's analysis, in essence, demonstrates that the er-
ror was not harmless and, therefore, that reversal of the decision may
have been warranted on the grounds that the prosecutor's comments
constituted prejudicial error. Instead, the court chose to adopt a per se
rule that abandons the harmless error analysis preferred by the United
States Supreme Court.
The holding in DiLoreto has some notable practical consequences
for practitioners in the Third Circuit. Foremost, the application of a per
se rule of reversal will lessen the criminal defendant's burden on appeal.
The DiLoreto holding liberates defendants from having to establish prej-
udice from a prosecutor's statement.73 The defendant need only estab-
lish that the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of the witness, and
that the statements were based on evidence outside the record.74
DiLoreto also places prosecutors in a very precarious position. Prosecu-
tors will need to be more cautious in summation because an inadvertent
statement made in response to a defense attorney's prior remarks could
ultimately result in reversal. 75
A statement may be deemed to be proper rehabilitation in a specific
fact situation and, yet, in another, may be deemed as improper vouching
for the credibility of a witness. For example, in United States v. Turlty, 76 a
case decided shortly after DiLoreto, the Third Circuit addressed the issue
of whether a prosecutor had improperly vouched for the credibility of a
witness. 7 7 Turley had objected to the prosecutor's statement that the
government knows when a witness is telling the truth by doing a thor-
70. For a discussion of the harmless error rule, see supra notes 13 & 14.
71. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 1000.
72. Id.
73. For a further discussion of the impact of the DiLoreto holding, see supra
notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
74. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d at 999. The Third Circuit, however, continues to
place the burden on the defendant to demonstrate prejudice with respect to
statements that are based on evidence adduced at trial. Id. at n.2.
75. See United States v. Homer, 545 F.2d 864, 868 (3d Cir. 1976) (citing
United States v. Leftwich, 461 F.2d 586, 590 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915
(1972)), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). In Homer, the court pointed to the
nature of opening and closing arguments in an adversary proceeding as leading
to verbal indiscretion, and that, therefore, reversal is warranted only where the
remarks are obviously prejudicial. Id. at 868.
76. 891 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1989).
77. Id. at 62.
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ough investigation, so " 'when they lie to you, you know when they're
lying to you.' ",78 The district court overruled the defense attorney's ob-
jection on the ground that the statement was "a fair response to a de-
fense statement."'79 The district court found that the prosecutor's
remarks were designed only to inform the jury "of evidence already con-
tained in the record that all plea agreements by these witnesses required
them to provide truthful testimony." 80 The court chose not to interpret
the statement as expressing the prosecutor's personal belief, but instead
found it "fair rebuttal of the defense's allegations of perjured testimony
by plea bargained witnesses supported by the record." 8 '
In DiLoreto, the government also argued that the prosecutor's com-
ments were intended only to emphasize the condition of the plea agree-
ments that the witnesses testify truthfully.8 2 In DiLoreto, however, the
court characterized the prosecutor's statement as an assertion that the
government had a policy of not putting liars on the stand. The DiLoreto
court, like the court in Turley, could have found that the prosecutor's
statements were only re-emphasizing the requirement of truthfulness,
and that the prosecution had merely assured itself that it would know if
the witnesses were lying. It is submitted that the distinction between the
comments made in DiLoreto and those made in Turley is tenuous at best,
and serves to further exemplify how such a fact-specific analysis makes it
difficult for prosecutors to gauge the propriety of their comments.
It is possible to read the decision in Turley as an indication that the
courts will be more lenient in deciding what is improper vouching as a
result of the potential severity of the consequences of the per se reversal
rule adopted in DiLoreto. If this is the case, then prosecutors may have
been given some breathing room by the Third Circuit.
IV. CONCLUSION
After DiLoreto, the actual prejudicial effect of a prosecutor's state-
ments vouching for the credibility of a witness that are based on evi-
dence outside the record is no longer of consequence. The Third
Circuit's decision to take the burden of establishing unfair prejudice
away from the defendant is very likely motivated by a desire to find an
effective method of controlling prosecutorial misconduct as it did not
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1091, 1097 (3d Cir. 1983);
United States v. DiLoreto, 888 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (3d Cir. 1989)). The Turley
Court interpreted DiLoreto as proscribing, as impermissible vouching, a prosecu-
tor from telling the jury "we don't put liars on the stand" without "explaining
how the government 'ascertains the honesty or veracity of its witnesses.' " Id. at
62-63.
82. For a further discussion of the DiLoreto court's analysis, see supra notes
54-57 and accompanying text.
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss3/12
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
need to extend the per se rule in order to decide DiLoreto. Both the
court's dicta that the prosecutor's statements may have prejudiced the
jury, and the lack of a curative instruction by the district court judge was
sufficient grounds for the Third Circuit to have found that the defendant
had been unfairly prejudiced by the prosecutor's statements and that
reversal was required in the interests ofjustice. It is submitted that the
adoption of a per se rule is not in the best interest ofjustice. To review a
prosecutor's statement in a vacuum, instead of reviewing its effect on the
trial in light of the entire record, is not sanctioned by either prior Third
Circuit decisions, nor United States Supreme Court precedent.8 3 Con-
sequently, society's interest in seeing that the guilty are punished is
subordinated to the court's interest in preventing prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Although such conduct is improper and the courts have a legiti-
mate interest in effectively curbing prosecutorial abuses, the harmless
error analysis advocated by the Supreme Court is the fairest compro-
mise for addressing both society's interest and the court's concerns.
The Supreme Court has clearly expressed that it does not sanction
using reversal as a method of controlling a prosecutor's misconduct.8 4
As the Court has stated "[W]hen courts fashion rules whose violations
83. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's position on per se reversal, see
supra notes 13-14. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's prior decisions, see
supra notes 35, 37, 59 and accompanying text.
84. The petition for rehearing of the DiLoreto decision was denied. 888
F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1989), reh' denied (1990). Four circuit court judges dis-
sented, however, from the denial of that petition. Id. Circuit Judge Sloviter,
who wrote for the dissenters, read the DiLoreto decision as establishing a per se
reversal right "whenever the government makes remarks regarding not only the
defendant's guilt but also a witness' credibility that are based on information
not adduced at trial." Id. at 1001. Judge Sloviter, in stating the reasons why an
en banc rehearing should have been granted, noted that previous Third Circuit
decisions had been unclear as to what should be the appropriate rule of reversal.
Id. She did note, however, that "use of a per se reversal standard to any species
of prosecutorial misconduct such as improper vouching, deviates from the clear
instruction of the Supreme Court that courts must look in each case to whether
the defendant has been prejudiced before directing a reversal." Id. After dis-
cussing both the Supreme Court's decisions in Young and Hasting, Judge Sloviter
stated:
I see no reason why the principle articulated by the Supreme Court in
Young and Hasting does not override the earlier statement this court
made in Swinehart. Nonetheless, because the panel apparently believes,
notwithstanding what appears to me to be the clear message from the
Supreme Court, that it is bound by prior decisions of this court to apply
a per se rule to the concededly improper prosecutorial vouching made in
this case, rehearing by the court in banc is appropriate for full consider-
ation as to whether our earlier precedent can withstand the light later
cast on the issue by Supreme Court decisions.
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mandate automatic reversals, they 'retrea[t] from their responsibility,
becoming instead "impregnable citadels of technicalities." ' "85
Isabel M. Albuquerque
85. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (citing Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1218
(1985).
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